University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

1-27-1970

In re Bushman
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
1 Cal.3d 767

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

IN BE BUSHMAN

Cal.

727

Cite as 463 P .2d 727

warrant, as prescribed by People v. Stout
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 184, 192, 57 Cal.Rptr. 152,
158, 424 P.2d 704, 780, namely, "whether the

People v. Scoma (1969) 71 A.C. 349, 357,
78 Cal.Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419.)
I would grant a peremptory writ of man-

facts contained in the affidavit are such

date directing the respondent superior

as would lead a man of ordinary caution
or prudence to believe, and ~onscientiousIy entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt
of the accused." To the foregoing rule
must be added the Spinelli caveat that the
test to be applied by the magistrate is that
"based upon a common-sense reading of

court to order the disclosure of the identity
of the confidential informer, but I would

the entire affidavit."

The majority cling to the rhetoric but
overlook the ratio decidendi of Aguilar and
Spinelli. It is, as noted on pages 110--111
of 378 U.S., on page 1512 of 84 S.Ct. of
Agui/a,r, that an "evaluation of the constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that 'the informed and
deliberate detenninations of magistrates
empowered to issue warrants * * * are
to be preferred over the hurried action of
officers '" * *,''' and that the protection
of the Fourth Amendm~nt consists in requiring that the inferences of reasonable
men" 'be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.'"
The affidavit for this warrant was detailed, not merely an abbreviated form. It
was submitted to a neutral and detached
magistrate. It was thoughtfully reviewed
in a lO-page memorandum by the superior
court judge. It was reviewed again by the
Court of Appeal, which denied petitions
for prohibition and mandate. I cannot hold
that all three courts erroneously approved
the issuance of the warrant.
In finding error, the majority now add
another to the unfortunate congeries of
cases that can only have an inhibiting effect upon law enforcement agencies which
seek in good faith to comply with the
public policy favoring reliance upon warrants instead of probable cause. (See my
<1issents in People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.
2d 418, 431, 67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321;
People v. Hamilton (1969) supra, 71 A.C.
189, 196, 77 Cal.Rptr. 785, 454 P.2d 681;

deny a writ ordering suppression of evi-

dence.
BURKE, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. I would uphold the trial court's
determination that the informer was not
a material witness on the issue of guilt~
and that disclosure 'of his identity was not
prerequisite to a fair trial.
I concur in that portion of the dissenting
opinion of Justice Mosk upholding the sufficiency of the affidavit for the issuance
of the search warrant for the reasons
stated therein.
I would deny the issuance of a writ under these circumstances.
McCOMB,

J.,

concurs.

Rehearing denied;
McCOMB
BURKE, JJ., dissenting.
o

and

i~KU"':::'M:::'::"-::":::"'''''''
,

83 Cal.Rptr. 375
In re Ted BUSH MAN on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 13712.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 27, 1970.

Proceeding for writ of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J., held
that the statute providing that every person
who maliciously and willfully disturbs the
peace or quiet of any person by tumultuous
or offensive conduct is guilty of misdemeanor is not violative of free speech inasmuch as it does not make criminal any
nonviolent act unless the act incites or
threatens to incite others to violence, the
court also held that where defendant had
taken a bucket of gravel swept from an
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airport runway to a meeting and, according
to his testimony, accidentally spilled gravel
on the desk and papers of an airport board
officer, the court erred prejudicially in so
defining "offensive" as to include conduct

protected by the First Amendment and in
failing to instruct on the contention that
the spilling was accidental.

Writ granted and petitioner discha rged
Burke and McComb, JJ., dissented.

6. Breach of the Peace cg:::,1

Statute providing that every person who
maliciously and willfully disturbs peace
or quiet of any person by tumultuous or
offensive conduct is guilty of misdemeanor
does not make criminal any nonviolent act
unless act incites or threatens to incite
others to violence. West's Ann.Pen.Code,
§ 415.
7. Breach of the Peace €::::>II
Criminal Law <PI 172(1), 1173(2)

I. Criminal Law

~13

Statute providing that every person
who maliciously and willfully disturbs peace
or quiet of any person by tumultuous or
offensive conduct is guilty of misdemeanor

is not unconstitutionally vague and over-

broad.

West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415.

2. Breach of the Peace ~I
Phrases "disturb the

peace" and
"breach of the peace" as used in misdemeanor statute are substantially synonymous
and are taken to mean disruption of public
order by acts which are themselves violent
or which tend to incite others to violence.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

3. Breach of the Peace ~I
Constitutional Law ~90

Statute providing that every person who
maliciously and willfully disturbs peace or
quiet of any person by tumultuous or offensive conduct is guilty of misdemeanor
:is not, as construed by courts, violative
of First Amendment free speech guaranty.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415; U.S.C.A.
Canst. Amend. 1.
4. Constitutional Law

~90

Not all acts intended to express ideas
or convey information are protected forms
of speech. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.
5. Criminal Law

~5

When public order and safety are
threatened by violence, states may restrict
or punish conduct which creates such
threat. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415; U.S.
c.A.Const. Amend. 1.

Where defendant had taken bucket of
gravel swept from airport runway to meeting and, according to his testimony, accidentally spilled gravel on desk and papers
of airport board officer, court erred prejudicially, in prosecution for disturbing
peace, in so defining "offensive" as to
:nc1ude conduct protected by First Amendment and in failing to instruct on contention that spilling was accidental.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415; U.S.C.A.
Canst. Amend. 1.
8. Breach of the Peace ¢::::'I

Defendant's appearance at meeting with
alleged intent to annoy _,airport board did
not in and of itself constitute disturbance
of the peace. West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.
9. Breach of the Peace

~II

Where complaint for disturbance of
peace charged tumultuous and offensive
conduct, but statute proscribed disturbance
of peace by tumultuous or offensive conduct, instruction relieving jury from necessity of agreeing to charge of both tumultuous and offensive conduct was proper.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415.
10. Indictment and Information <$=>125(20)

Where statute lists several acts in disjunctive, anyone of which constitutes offense, complaint, in alleging more than one
of such acts, should do so in conjunctive
to avoid uncertainty. West's Ann.Pen.
Code, § 415.
II. Witnesses

~386

In prosecution for disturbance of peace,
where defendant, who had been protesting
condition of airport ruriways, testified that
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some governmental agencies agreed with
him but that others were either unconcerned or disagreed, letter from Federal Aeronautics Administration disagreeing
with defendant was not inconsistent with his
testimony and could not be used to impeach,
and should have been excluded as hearsay.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 415.
12. Criminal Law _82.6(5)
If defendant considers conditions of

probation more harsh than sentence which
court would otherwise impose, he has right
to refuse probation and undergo sentence.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1.
13. Criminal Law 0&=>1134(10)
Habeas Corpus 0&=>25.2(4)

Defendant may challenge legality of
any proposed conditions of probation on
appeal from judgment or on habeas corpus.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1.
14. Criminal Law

17. Criminal Law 0&=>982.5(2)

Absent any evidence to support trial
court's conclusion that defendant sentenced
for disturbance of peace needed psychiatric
care, imposition of requirement of psychiatric treatment as condition of probation was
invalid. West's Ann.Pen.Code, §§ 415,
1203.1.

John M. Sink, Santa Barbara, for petitioner.
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence
R. Sperber, Los Angeles, as amici curiae
on behalf of petitioner.
David D. Minier, Dist. Atty., and A. Barry Cappello, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., for
respondent.

~1188

If it is determined that proposed condition of probation is invalid, judgment should
be vacated and defendant given opportunity
to accept probation on lawful conditions.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1
15. Habeas Corpus 0&=>25.2(4), 30(3)

Although habeas corpus cannot serve as
substitute for appeal to review determination of fact made on conflicting evidence,
it may be used to review validity of sen-

tence or order of probation which can be
corrected without redetermination of any
questions of fact. West's Ann.Pen.Code,
§ 1203.1.
16. Criminal Law 0&=>982.5(2)

Condition of probation is invalid if it
(1) has no relationship to crime of which
defendant is convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not of itself criminal, or
(3) requires or forbids conduct which is
I. PeDnI Code section 415 provides: "E~ery
person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person, by loud or unusual noise,
or by tumultuous or offensive conduct,
or threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting, or who, on
the public streets of any unincorporated
town, or upon the public highways in such
463 p .2d-461/z

not reasonably related to future criminality.
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 1203.1.

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
A jury found petitioner guilty of disturbing the peace in violation of Penal
Code section 415.1 The trial court imposed
the maximum sentence (90 days in jail
and a $200 fine), but suspended execution
~f the sentence and granted probation. The
conviction was affirmed by the appellate
department of the superior court, which
denied certification to the Court of Appeal.
The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. (395 U.S. 944, 89 S.Ct. 2018,
23 L.Ed.2d 463 (1969).) Petitioner now
seeks habeas corpus in this court.
Petitioner is a practicing attorney and a
licensed private pilot. On numerous occasions before the incident leading to his
conviction, petitioner appeared before the
Santa Maria Public Airport District Board
of Directors in his capacity as an attorney
and as a private pilot. During the year
unincorporated town, run any horse-race,
either for a wager or for amusement, or
fire any gun or pistol in such unincorporated town, or use any vulgar, profane,
or indecent language within the presence
or hearing of women or children, in a
loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of
as misdemeanor, * * * OJ

730
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the runways were cracked, pitted, weed-

disturb the peace and quiet of Donald M.
Prentice and the Board of Directors of the
Santa Maria Public Airport District by
tumultuous and offensive conduct." 2,

grown, and littered with glass and metal
debris. He was particularly concerned
with significant amounts of loose gravel
on the runways that were causing damage

In this proceeding petitioner attacks his
conviction on the grounds that Penal Code
section 415 is unconstitutional and that errors at the trial require reversal. We have

to his and others' aircraft.

Petitioner's

concluded that the writ should be granted.

frequent complaints to the board apparently went unanswered. He testified that his

Petitioner contends that section 415 is so
vague, it provides no ascertainable standard of guilt and thus denies due process
of law. He also contends that thr.: section
is overbroad and makes punishable con-

preceding the incident, petitioner complained

to the board about the condition of the
runways at the airport.

He alleged that

relations with the members of the board
had become so volatile that his mere pres-

ence at board meetings provoked anger and
resentment.

duct protected by the First Amendment.

The day before a regular board .meeting,
petitioner went to the airport's main runway
with a broom, bucket, and dustpan. He

[1,2] Section 415 is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. It has a commonly understood meaning that not only

made five parallel sweeps across the width

affords adequate notice of the type of con-

of the runway, collecting approximately 10
pounds of gravel and metal debris. On the

duct that is proscribed, but also precludes
its application to conduct protected by the
First Amendment. The part of the section
under which petitioner was convicted provides: "Every person who maliciously and
willfully disturbs the peace or quiet' of any
* * * person *
by tumultuous
or offensive conduct * * * is guilty of
a misdemeanor." The terms "disturb the
peace" and "breach of the peace/, which are
substantially synonymous, have long been
understood to mean disruption of public
order by acts that are themselves violent
or that tend to incite others to violence.
Thus, one may be guilty of disturbing the
peace within that part of section 415 if
he engages in "tumultuousll conduct, i. e.,
violent conduct that wilfully and maliciously
endangers public safety or order. He may
also be guilty of disturbing the peace
through "offensive" conduct if by his actions he wilfully and maliciously incites
others to violence or engages in conduct
likely to incite others to violence. (People

morning of the following day, July 6, 1967,
Donald M. Prentice, president of the airport
board, convened a meeting of the full fivemember board. The roll call was taken and
the first three items on the agenda were
considered. As the board reached the
fourth item, petitioner entered the room,
carrying a bucket of gravel in both hands
at chest level. Without speaking he walked
to the desk where Prentice was presiding.
According to the People's evidence petitioner deliberately dumped the contents of
the bucket over Prentice's desk and papers.
Prentice called petitioner a "dirty low-down
son of a bitch" and hit him. Members
of the board's staff restrained Prentice, and
petitioner walked from the room. According to petitioner's testimony he intended to
set the bucket of debris upright on Prentice's desk to demonstrate the condition of
the runways to the board, the public, and
the press, but accidentally spilled the contents of the bucket when Prentice hit him.
I

Petitioner was charged by com'plaint with
violating Penal Code section 415, in that

he "did willfully, unlawfully and maliciously
2. Petitioner was also charged with violating Penal Code section 403 (disturbing
a meeting or assembly). The trial court

* *

v. Cohen (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 94, 101, 81
Cal.Rptr. 503.)
[3] The foregoing construction of section 415 assures that conduct protected by
sustained a demurrer to the charge on
the grounds that section 403 is unconstitutional.
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the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech is not made criminal. Unlike
the city ordinance considered by the United
States Supreme Court in Terminiello v. City
of Chicago (1948) 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894,
93 L!Ed. 1131, that permitted conviction if
one's speech "stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a
condition of unrest" (337 U.S. 1, 5, 69
S.Ct. 894, 896), or the statute considered
by that court in Cantwell v. Connecticut
(1939) 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed.
1213, that permitted conviction although
there was no clear and present danger to
public peace and order, that part of Penal
Code section 415 in question here makes
punishable only wilful and malicious conduct that is violent and endangers public
safety and' order or that creates a clear
and present danger that others will engage
in violence of that nature.

[4-6] Petitioner contends that his conduct was a legitimate means of conveying
his grievances to the airport directors. He
urges that -his actions were a form of
"synibolic speech" protected by the First
Amendment. Not all acts intended to express ideas or convey information are protected forms of free speech. (United States
v. O'Brien (1968) 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88
S.C!. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672; see also Adderley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39, 47-48,
87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149.) When public order and safety are threatened by violence, states may restrict or punish the
conduct that creates such threat. (Cantwell
v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. 296, 307311, 60 S.Ct. 900.) Inasmuch as that part
of section 415 considered here does not
make criminal any nonviolent act unless
the act incites or threatens to incite others
to violence, it is unnecessary to decide
whether petitioner's act was "communication," for the test is the same whether
acts are intended to communicate ideas
or not.
[7,8] The trial court, however, failed
to instruct the jury in accordance with the
foregoing construction of section 415, which
preserves its constitutionality. The court

advised the jury that "'offensive' means
giving offense; causing displeasure or resentment; insulting."
The instruction
makes criminal, conduct that is protected
by the First Amendment. Moreover, the
jury might have convicted petitioner on the
basis of such protected conduct without
reaching the question whether the spilling
of the gravel was intentional or accidental.
Thus, petitioner testified that his mere presence before the airport board of directors
caused anger and resentment. Accordingly,
the jury might have found petitioner guilty
of "offensive conduct" if he made any appearance calculated to vex or annoy the
board -of directors,. regardless of whether
petiti~ner's conduct was violent or incited
others to violence. Moreover, the appellate
department of the superior court, in affirming petitioner's conviction, held that his
appearance with the intent to annoy the
board "in and of itself constituted a disturbance of the peace." Under these circumstances, petitioner has discharged his
burden on habeas corpus of proving that
his conviction was based on constitutionally
protected conduct. (In re Klor (1966) 64
Ca1.2d 816, 821-822, 51 Ca1.Rptr. 903, 415
P.2d 791.)
In view of our conclusion that the conviction must be set aside because the jury
was improperly instructed, it is not necessary to consider all of petitioner's additional assignments of error. We consider
some of these alleged errors, however,
which may occur again on retrial, for the
guidance of the trial court. (Code Civ.
Proc. § 53.)
Petitioner contends that the trial court
erred in not instructing the jury that to
find him guilty, they must find that his conduct was both tumultuous and offensive.
[9] The complaint charged petitioner
with "tumultuous and offensive conduct."
In instructing the jury, the court said: "The
defendant is charged in the Complaint to
have maliciously disturbed the peace by
tumultuous and offensive conduct. He may
be found gnilty of maliciously disturbing
the peace if you find that he did in fact
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maliciously disturb that peace by tumultuous conduct or by offensive conduct alone.
It is not necessary that you agree to the
charge of both tumultuous and offensive
conduct." That instruction was proper.
[10] When a statute such as Penal Code
section . .U5 lists several acts in the disjunctive, anyone of which constitutes an offense, the complaint, in alleging more than
one of such acts, should do so in the conjunctive to avoid uncertainty.
(People v.
Ah Woo (1865) 28 Cal. 205, 212; People
v. O'Brien (1900) 130 Cal. 1,3-4,62 P. 297.)
Merely because the complaint is phrased in
the conjunctive, however, does not prevent
a trier of fact from convicting a defendant
if the evidence proves only one of the alleged acts. (People v. McClennegen (1925)
195 Cal. 445,452,234 P. 91.) The jury could
have found petitioner guilty of "tumultuous
conduct" if the evidence proved that his conduct was maliciously and wilfully violent,
endangering public safety and order. They
might also have found him guilty of Hof_
fensive conduct" if his malicious and wilful
actions incited others to violence, although
his own conduct was not in itself violent.
Petitioner objected to the introduction into evidence of a letter to him from the
Federal Aviation Administration, asserting
that it was hearsay. The letter, dated January 23, 1968, acknowledges the receipt of
two previous letters from petitioner, the
earliest dated August 8, 1967 (one month
after the alleged breach of the peace). The
letter further stated that after receiving
the two letters from petitioner the agency
made inspections of the runways. They
concluded on the basis of these inspections
that the airport was being properly maintained. The letter did not refer to the condition of the runways on or before July 6, 1967.
3. In nddition to the condition of probation
in issue, the court required petitioner to
make tl llromi}t and sincere apology to the
president and members of the airport dis·
trict board of directors; to reimburse the
airport district $100 as payment for costs
of cleaning, lost time and photography
expenses; to resign as newly elected pres·

[11] The People contend that the evidence was not hearsay, on the ground that
it was not introduced to prove the truth of
the matters asserted therein, but to impeach
petitioner's previous testimony. The contention is without merit. Petitioner testified that he sent numerous letters to many
agencies about the condition of the runways,
and that he received different replies. Although sonie agencies agreed with him,
petitioner admitted that others were either
unconcerned with the problem or disagreed
with him entirely. One letter disagreeing
with petitioner on the condition of the runways cannot be used to impeach his testimony since it is 110t inconsistent with it.
Petitioner did not testify that the F.A.A.
letter said anything other than what it did
say.
The letter of January 23, 1968, from the
F.A.A. was hearsay and did not come within
any exceptions to the hearsay rule. That
letter, therefore, should have been excluded.
Finally, the trial court suspended execution of petitioner's sentence and ordered
that he be placed on two years' probation.
In addition to the usual terms and conditions of probation, the court imposed five
special conditions.3 One condition required
petitioner to seek psychiatric treatment at
his own expense with a qualified psychiatrist approved by the court, and to continue
the treatment as required by the doctor and
approved by the probation department and
the court. Petitioner contends that imposition of this condition is beyond the court's
jurisdiction. We agree.
[12-15] When
granting
probation,
courts have broad discretion to impose restrictive conditions to foster rehabilitation
and to protect public safety. Penal Code
section 1203.1 authorizes the court to impose any "reasonable conditions, as it may
ident of the airport board; and to submit
himself to the local bar association for
·possible disciplinary action. In affirming
petitioner's conviction, the nppellate de~
partment of the superior court struck aU
conditions except the one in issue and the
condition of reimbursement. Petitioner
does not contest the latter condition.
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detennine are fitting and proper to the end
that justice may be done, * * * and specifical1y for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer." If the defendant
considers the conditions of probation more

harsh than the sentence the -court would
otherwise impose, he has the right to refuse
probation and undergo the sentence. (In
re Osslo (1958) 51 Cal.2d 371, 377, 334 P.2d
1; People v. Frank (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d
740, 741-742, 211 P.2d 350.) In such case
he may challenge the legality of any proposed conditions of probation on an appeal
from the judgment or on habeas corpus.
(In re Osslo, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 382, 334
P.2d 1; In re Allen (1%9) 71 A.C. 409,
410, 78 Cal.Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143.) If it
is determined that a proposed condition of
probation is invalid, the judgment should
be vacated and the defendant given an opportunity to accept probation on lawful conditions. If, on the other hand, the defendant accepts probation, he may seek relief
from the restraint of any alleged invalid
condition of probation on appeal from the
order granting probation or on habeas corpus. (In re Allen, supra, 71 A.C. at p. 410,
78 Cal.Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143; In re Osslo,
supra, 51 Cal.2d at pp. 381-382, 334 P.2d 1.)
Although habeas corpus cannot serve as a
substitute for appeal to review a determination of the fact made on conflicting evidence
(In re Dixon (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 756,760, 264
P.2d 513; In re Lindley (1947) 29 Ca1.2d
709, 722, 177 P.2d 918), it may be used to
review the validity of a sentence or order of
probation that can be corrected without the
redetermination of any questions of fact.
(In re McInturff (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 876,
880-$1, 236 P.2d 574; Neal v. State of
California (1%0) 55 Cal.2d 11, 16-17, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839.)

733

There is no evidence to support the trial
court's conclusion that petitioner needed
psychiatric care. No expert witnesses testified to mental condition. Neither the prosecution nOT the court questioned any witnesses about that condition. Under these
circumstances the condition as to psychiatric care had no relationship to the crime
of which petitioner was convicted. Furthermore, without any showing that mental instability contributed to that offense, psychiatric care cannot reasonably be related to
future -criminality.
The writ of habeas corpus is granted, and
petitioner is discharged from the custody
imposed by the Municipal Court of the
Santa Maria Judicial District pursuant to
the judgment of May 28, 1%8.
PETERS, TOBRINER,
SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.

MOSK

and

BURKE, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent, for in my view petitioner clearly
failed to prove that his conviction was
based solely upon conduct which the majority hold to be constitutionally protected.
The majority rely exclusively upon In re
Klor, 64 Cal.2d 816, 822, 51 Cal.Rptr. 903,
907, 415 P.2d 791, 795, wherein this court
stated: "We have held that a petitioner,
who collaterally attacks a conviction based
upon a statute containing both valid and
invalid portions bears the 'burden of proving that he was not tried and convicted for
violating the valid part of the statute.' (In
re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 504 [122 P.2d
22].)"
In Klor, we granted habeas corpus after
concluding that "So strong was the evidence
tending to establish petitioner's guilt ,under I
[16,17] A condition of probation im- the erroneous portion of the charge and ,so
posed pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1 weak! the evidence which would ground a
is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the ·conv~cti~n under 'the valid portion that we
crime of which the defendant is convicted, determine that petitioner can discharge his
(2) relates to conduct that is not itself crim- 'burden bf proving that he was not * * *
inal, or (3) requires or forbids conduct conviction for violating the valid part.
that is not reasonably related to future * * *,,,
criminality. (People v. Dominguez (1%7)
On the other hand, in In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d
256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627, 64 Cal.Rptr. 290.) 488, 122 P.2d 22, cited as controlling in Klar
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we discharged the writ or. the ground that
"Petitioners in the present case have failed
to sustain the burden of proving that t~ey
were not tried and convicted for acts of
violence since the transcripts of testimony at
their trials reveal evidence of such acts. * *
Because petitioners have failed to sustain
the burden of proving that they were not
convicted of the one valid provision of the
ordinance prohibiting acts of violence, the
writ heretofore issued is discharged and the
petitioners are remanded to the custody of
the sheriff of Yuba County." (Italics added; 19 Cal.2d at pp. 504-505, 122 P.2d at
pp. 31-32.) 1
The instant case is governed by BeU, not
by Klor. Unlike Klor, the evidence sup-

to prove the jury's nonreliance upon valid
grounds for conviction by establishing the
insubstantiality of the evidence supporting
those grounds. In Klor that evidence was
characterized as "weak." In Bell~ as in the
instant cas~, the contrary was true. Therefore, in effect, the majority opinion overrules Bell and Klor and improperly discards
their requirement that petitioner bear the
burden of proving the invalidity of his conviction.
J

McCOMB,

J., concurs.

o

,i "~ff"''''"M='':::'''''''''''='M''

porting petitioner's conviction under the

valid portion of Penal Code section 415 was,
in a word, overwhelming. The record discloses that petitioner entered the board
meeting and thereupon deliberately dumped
10 pounds of gravel and debris on President
Prentice's desk, thereby provoking Prentice
to lose his temper and to strike petitioner.!
The majority correctly assert that section
415 may validly be applied to "violent conduct that wilfully and maliciously endangers
public safety or order'~ (italics added), as
well as to "'offensive' conduct if by his
actions he wilfully and maliciously incites
others to violence * * *." (Ante, p.
730.) * Petitioner's conduct in disrupting
a public meeting and in inciting Prentice to
violence, clearly satisfied either standard.
The majority hypothesize that the jury
"might" have convicted petitioner on the
basis of his mere presence at the meeting.
But BeU and Klor foreclose all such speculation by placing the burden upon petitioner
I. Accord, In re Carlson, 64 Ca1.2d 70, 73-

75. 48 Cal.Rptr. 875, 410 P.2d 379. It
should be noted that both the Bell case
and the instant case involved convictions
affirmed by the appellate department of
the superior court, without further appeal. Thus, the Bell test regarding the
burden of proof in habeas corpus proceed·
ings is controlling here.
2. The otlly evidence to the contrary was
petitioner's own testimony that he accidentally spilled the gravel after Pren-

83 Ca1.Rptr. 382
In re Ralph MARTINEZ on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 13858.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan, 23, 1970.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus by
prisoner seeking release on ground that
adult authority's determination to terminate
his parole status was based on evidence
obtained through unconstitutional search
and seizure and improperly obtained confession. The Supreme Court, Tobriner,
J., held that adult authority in deciding to
reaffirm revocation of petitioner's parole
from 1955 sentence could properly consider evidence and statements used in obtaining 1963 conviction even though 1963
conviction had been reversed on ground
tice swore at him and grabbed his arm.
This testimony was repudiated by the
other witnesses and by a tape recording
establishing that petitioner dumped the
gravel before Prentice swore at him. The
trial court bluntly characterized petitioner's testimony as "perjury," stating that
"The jury did not believe the testimony
of Mr. Bushman that the dumping of the
gravel wns an accident."
• Opinion, p. 730.

